Is natural gas really a bridge fuel?

It depends on two variables: the leak rate and the destination. Burning gas emits roughly 50% less CO₂ than coal for the same heat, but that advantage vanishes once methane leakage exceeds about 3%. And the trillions of dollars flowing into new LNG terminals and pipelines lock fossil fuel use in for another forty years.

Two forecasts frame the debate. McKinsey projects that global gas demand could peak around 2037 and then decline slowly rather than collapse — a plateau-then-fade scenario. The IEA's net zero scenario, by contrast, requires an immediate and steep reduction in gas use. The distance between them is the policy gap: aggressive carbon pricing and electrification mandates would bring the peak forward sharply, while a world that prioritises energy security and low prices could still be gas-dominated in the 2050s. That uncertainty is producing a capital strike, as investors fear new multi-decade projects will become stranded assets before they pay back.

The critics' core arguments are carbon lock-in and crowding out. Once billions of dollars of infrastructure exist, there is a powerful economic incentive to run it until the sunk cost is recovered, whatever the climate consequences, and a temporary bridge becomes a permanent highway. Cheap abundant gas has also historically dragged on renewable investment — widely regarded as one reason US solar grew slowly through the 2010s. There is a social justice dimension too: most compressor stations and processing plants sit in lower-income or minority communities, where nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds do local health damage even when the global CO₂ footprint is lower than coal's.

The global view adds another layer. For countries in sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia, the luxury of skipping the gas bridge and going straight to a 100% renewable grid looks like a Western fantasy; sudden Western opposition to gas is described as energy colonialism. India aims to lift gas from 6% to 15% of its energy mix precisely to reduce millions of households' dependence on toxic wood and coal stoves. Out of these opposing positions a sector-by-sector view is emerging: gas as a bridge for home cooking or light passenger cars may already be unnecessary, but as a bridge for high-temperature industrial heat in glass and steel, and for seasonal balancing of a wind-heavy grid, it remains hard to replace.

Singapore has turned the theoretical argument into an engineering problem. Gas supplies about 95% of the city-state's electricity (Energy Market Authority) and underpins 99.9999% grid reliability; on 730 km² with no hinterland, the fast-responding combined-cycle gas turbines on Jurong Island are what stops the grid collapsing when a tropical storm rolls in or cloud cover kills solar output. Its answer is hydrogen readiness: most new turbines installed by companies such as Keppel and Sembcorp are designed to burn gas-hydrogen blends and eventually 100% hydrogen. Meanwhile the second SLNG terminal will lift national regasification capacity to 15 Mtpa, and Singapore GasCo, established in 2024, centralises gas procurement to stabilise prices. This is building a bridge out of material that can be retrofitted for tomorrow.

If we replace coal with gas today while building the carbon capture and hydrogen infrastructure of tomorrow, the bridge is sound; if we treat gas as a permanent substitute for the hard work of deep decarbonisation, the bridge becomes a road to nowhere.

This question is covered in depth in The Full Spectrum Every Energy Source Explained — A Singapore Perspective，第五章 5.6、5.7 与新加坡特写